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Abstract

The Air Force Class A aviation mishap rate has hovered around 1.5 mishaps per
100,000 flight hours since 1985. Recent attention on Air Force accidents has caused the
leadership to seek to reduce its mishap rate. The Army's Class A aviation mishap rate
declined after it implemented risk management (RM) principles in 1987. This reduction
caught the attention of Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of
operational risk management (ORM) is how the Air Force will reduce, even eliminate,
mishaps. With current budget constraints, ORM is considered to be the most costeffective way the Air Force can reduce its mishap rate.
The purpose of this research was to determine whether the Air Force can expect
its mishap rate to significantly decline due to ORM implementation. This determination
is based on the relationship between the Army's implementation of RM and its aviation
mishap rate. The analysis of the Army's aviation mishap rates and available causal data
was performed primarily using discontinuous piecewise linear regression. Results
showed that the effect of RM was not reflected in the Army's mishap rates. As a result,
the Air Force should not expect its mishap rate to significantly decline due to ORM
implementation.

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT AND MILITARY AVIATION SAFETY
I. Introduction

Background
Since man has been flying, aircraft accidents have taken lives, destroyed property,
and damaged or destroyed aircraft. Between 1990 and 1996 alone Department of
Defense (DoD) aviation losses totaled $9.42 billion, 777 lost lives, and 741 destroyed
aircraft (Department of Defense, 1997:ES-2). Flying aircraft, particularly military
aircraft that could experience the hazard of combat, is an inherently risky endeavor.
Thus, continuously improving military flight safety is a high priority for both civilian and
military leaders.
In June 1995, Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri raised concerns over Air
Force mishaps. He cited accidents such as the B-52 crash at Fairchild AFB, the T-38
crash in Texas that hit an apartment complex and the infamous F-15 friendly-fire shootdown of two Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq. Skelton proposed that training,
flying hours, spare part resources, and high operations tempo were possible factors for
these mishaps (Dorr, 1995:8,9).
Whenever an aviation mishap occurs, a safety investigation ensues. All DoD
flight mishap investigations take the form of limited-use safety mishap investigation
reports. An investigation's "SOLE purpose is prevention of subsequent DoD mishaps"
(Department of Defense, 1989). However, corrective actions to prevent mishaps from
reoccurring can be costly not only in terms of dollars, but in time and manpower.

Addressing the primary causes of mishaps and taking steps to prevent mishaps due to
these causes is the most logical course of action to improve flight safety. Traditional
mishap prevention has centered on improving design of aircraft and maintenance
inspection techniques. In an increasingly fiscally constrained operating environment,
these methods only go so far toward mishap reduction. Other avenues must be sought
and applied if the DoD is going to improve its safety record.
A study performed by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Aviation Safety
reported that human error was at least a contributing factor in over 70 percent of DoD
Class A mishaps (Department of Defense, 1997:31), the primary measure of flight safety.
It determined that the practice of risk management (RM) would be the most effective and
least costly method of mishap reduction (1997:31). In fact, one of the recommendations
that came out of the study was to integrate RM practices throughout all the services
(1997:ES-4). In a letter to all the service secretaries, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
suggested a goal of "zero aviation fatalities" with the integration of RM as a means to
that end (White, 1997).
The concept of RM has been formally applied to Army operations since 1987.
Although the Army did see a reduction in its Class A aviation mishap rate after the
implementation of RM, whether or not the reduction was due to RM has been
inconclusive.
Problem Statement
Although the DoD's Class A mishap rate has dropped considerably over the
history of aviation, during no year has it been zero. For the Air Force, there has been no

significant reduction in the Class A mishap rate since the mid-1980's. It has hovered
around 1.5 mishaps per 100,000 flying hours. In order to conserve its most important
resources, people and war machines, the Air Force is looking for ways to reduce its
aviation mishap rate. The Army aviation mishap rate reduction caught the attention of
Air Force leadership who have since stated that the application of operational risk
management (ORM) is how the Air Force will reduce, even eliminate, mishaps
(Department of the Air Force, 1998b). ORM has been applied on an experiential and
intuitive basis for many years but it wasn't until 1996 that the Chief of Staff approved
implementation of ORM Air Force-wide. With current budget constraints limiting
investment in new designs and inspection tools, ORM is viewed to be the most costeffective way the Air Force can reduce its mishap rate.
Research Question
Can the Air Force expect the mishap rate to significantly decline after ORM
implementation? The answer may lie in looking at the relationship between the Army's
implementation of RM and its aviation mishap rate.
Investigative Questions
1. What are the major factors that influence military aviation safety?
2. How does the Air Force implementation of ORM compare to the Army's
implementation of RM?
3. Was there a significant difference in the Army aircraft mishap rates after the
implementation of RM?
a) If so, was the difference due to the implementation of RM?

b) If there was a significant difference in the mishap rate, how much of an
effect was the implementation of RM?
Scope
This research deals specifically with the effect of risk management on the aviation
mishap rate as opposed to ground and off-duty mishap rates. Flight-related and aircraft
ground mishaps are not considered. Flight mishaps as defined in DODI 6055.7 are the
subject at hand. Although the primary focus will be on the Army Class A mishap rate
data, Classes B and C mishap data will also be analyzed to see what effect risk
management may have had. Although the Navy and Marine Corps have active ORM
programs, they, like the Air Force, are in the infancy of implementation. Since the Army
is the lead service concerning risk management, this research will predict what effect
ORM may have on the Air Force aviation mishap rate based on the effect RM has had on
the Army aviation mishap rate. An assumption for this research is that after RM
implementation into the Army, aviators incorporated RM practices into their mission
planning.

H. Literature Review
Overview
This chapter provides a background of aviation safety and risk management as it
relates to the Army and Air Force. Aviation safety factors are first discussed, describing
the typical mishap causes and mishap prevention methods. Second, a history of the risk
management concept is described. Safety and risk management terms are then defined as
they pertain to the Army and Air Force. Finally, Army and Air Force risk management
implementation is examined.
Aviation Safety Factors
There are an infinite number of factors that can affect the safety of any given
flight. It is the intention here, however, to identify the major factors recognized by the
aviation community as having a significant, proven impact on aviation safety. The
discussion will take two related paths. First, those factors typically found causal to a
mishap will be described. Second, the prevailing mishap prevention factors will be
addressed.
Mishap Cause Factors. According to DODI 6055.7, the four flight mishap cause
classifications are human factor, material failure, environment, and other (Department of
Defense, 1989). These factors are depicted in Figure 1. The instruction, however, does
not define those terms. The Army uses similar terms that parallel those of the DoD
instruction. The Army replaces the human factor term with human error, material failure
with materiel factors, and does not have an "other" category (Department of the Army,
1999a). The Air Force uses the categories of people, parts, paper, and other (Department

of the Air Force, 1998c:64). For the purposes of this research, the DoD terms will be
used. Another term that has received some attention as a viable mishap cause factor the
last few years is operational tempo.
Human Factors
Operations Tempo?

Material Failure

Environmental

Other
Figure 1. Aviation Mishap Cause Factors
Human Factors. "Human factors in aviation safety concerns itself with the
study of human capabilities, limitations, and behaviors and the integration ofthat
knowledge into a system design with the goals of enhancing safety and allowing for more
efficient operations" (The Southern California Safety Institute, 1999). Human factors
refers to how man and machine interact and is taken into consideration when designing
products. A related term is human error. The Army defines human error as "human
performance that deviated from that required by the operational standards or situation
(Department of the Army, 1999a). The Air Force uses various terms to describe peoplecaused mishaps: accepted risk, anthropometry, background, complacency, discipline,
drugs-medicine, judgment, pathological, perceptions, physiological, preparation,
proficiency and psychological (Department of the Air Force, 1998c:226). Mishaps

attributed to human factors are often deemed to be caused by human error. Since human
error is at least a contributing factor in the majority of aviation mishaps, it follows that
much literature exists describing why human errors occur. Specifically, research has
shown that pilot inexperience, spatial disorientation, and poor judgement are major
contributors to human error accidents.
Pilot inexperience as a mishap cause factor has been the subject of some study.
The Air Force's Tactical Air Command Class A mishap data from 1 January 1979 to 31
December 1983 revealed that 50 percent of operator caused mishaps involved a pilot with
fewer than 18 months and 300 hours in the mishap aircraft (McGraw, 1987:5,6).
Subsequent changes to the flying syllabus focused on preventing inexperienced pilot
mishaps. A review of the same data from 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1986 showed a
marked decrease in the percentage of mishaps involving inexperienced pilots. Similarly,
Borowsky showed that more experienced Naval pilots had a lower mishap rate than those
pilots with less experience. Experience was measured in terms of total flying hours and
flying hours by type of aircraft (Borowsky, 1986:ii).
Spatial disorientation is also a common cause of flight mishaps and significant
research has been done in that area over the years. Also called pilot vertigo, spatial
disorientation occurs when the pilot has an orientational illusion in flight. That is, he
believes he is in a particular "position, attitude, or motion relative to the plane of the
earth's surface" when in fact he is not (Gillingham, 1986:81). Studies of military
aviation show that the percent of mishaps in the Army (7.11 percent) and Navy (6.75
percent) where spatial disorientation was either the cause or a factor are consistent with
that of the Air Force. Studies during the periods 1954-1956,1964-1967,1958-1968,

1968-1972 and in 1979 revealed that the percentage of Air Force mishaps due to spatial
disorientation ranged from 4 to 9.6. The data from 1976 to 1997 reveal that average
spatial disorientation Class A mishap rate for fighter aircraft per 100,000 flying hours
was .39 (or 5.3 percent) of all fighter Class A mishaps during that time frame (Air Force
Safety Center, 1999). The general aviation sector has also suffered from spatial
disorientation problems but not as much as the military. As of 1979, only 2.4 percent of
general aviation mishaps were due to spatial disorientation (1986:83,84).
The FAA has long recognized the impact human error contributes toward causing
mishaps, particularly those causes resulting from poor judgement due to a faulty
decision-making process. As a result, in 1987, the FAA published a series of aircrew
training manuals entitled Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM). In Aeronautical
Decision Making for Commercial Pilots. Jensen and Adrion cite four building blocks that
a pilot must have for aviation safety and effectiveness: knowledge, skill, experience, and
judgement. Basic knowledge and skills are acquired through training courses, whereas
judgement is based on both experience and training (Jensen and Adrion, 1988:1). The
Bell Jet Ranger helicopter, used extensively in commercial aviation, saw a significant
reduction in human error-related accidents as a result of its crewmembers using the ADM
training materials (Adams, 1992:3). The Air Force and Navy also saw significant
reductions in human error related accidents (Adams, 1992:4) through use of the materials.
It can therefore be said that increased training, particularly in the decision making
process, can have a positive effect on human error related mishaps.
Material Failure. The second leading cause of aviation mishaps is material
failure. Since humans make aircraft materials, the materials will eventually fail.

Ultimately then, material failure can be traced to a human cause. The point of discussing
material failure, however, is to describe immediate reasons for the failure. The Army
defines materiel factors as "when materiel elements become inadequate or counterproductive to the operation of the vehicle/equipment/system" (Department of the Army,
1999a). The Air Force uses various terms to describe mishaps due to parts: acquisition,
attrition, design, faulty-part, modification, unauthorized modification, and other
(Department of the Air Force, 1998c:226-227). General causes of material failure
include design not adequate for the load, poor manufacturing process, and material wear
out. Material wear out is often due to corrosion or, in the case of aircraft engines, thermal
stress.
Environmental. Although not as common a mishap cause as human error
or material failure, the environment can have a significant effect on aviation safety. The
Army identifies environmental factors as those conditions that affect human or material
performance. These conditions may include weather, animals, and electromagnetic
environmental effects (E3). E3 result from high intensity radio transmissions and can
cause aircraft instruments to malfunction (Department of the Army, 1999a).
Other. As stated earlier, the Army does not have an "other" category but
the Air Force does. The Air Force includes animals, manning, other (new reason),
unknown, and weather in this category (Department of the Air Force, 1998c:227). The
Air Force does not have on "environmental" category but animals and weather would
correspond to the Army's environmental category.
Operations Tempo. Operations tempo has been suggested as having an
adverse affect on the mishap rate. A study performed by the Air Force in 1994 found no

direct correlation between the two (General Accounting Office, 1996:2). A year later,
however, the Air Force Chief of Staff commissioned four retired flag officers, a Blue
Ribbon Panel, to examine the Air Force safety program. The Panel did not define the
term "operational tempo" or express measures of how it is determined. Nevertheless, it
determined that at least six factors within the control of the Air Force contributed to
increased operations tempo and presented an aviation safety risk: orgamzational
changes; an unwritten, implicit masters degree requirement; personnel policies; stress at
the operational level due to frequent deployments; two level maintenance
implementation; support equipment shortages (Department of the Air Force, 1995:19,20).
Mishap Prevention Factors. For every mishap, there is a possible way that it
could have been prevented. This section considers four major areas of mishap prevention
as described in the literature: leadership, mishap investigation, advancement in
technology, and human factor programs. Figure 2 depicts these factors.
Leadership

Technology

Mishap Investigation

Human Factor Programs
Figure 2. Aviation Mishap Prevention Factors
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Leadership. According to the Defense Science Board, "leadership is the
single most important factor affecting aviation safety; Commanders at every level must
be personally involved" (Department of Defense, 1997:9). It would be beyond the scope
of this literature review to pursue a discourse on the Army and Air Force philosophies on
leadership. One can assume that there is no difference between what the Army and the
Air Force think makes a good military leader. The more appropriate discussion is the
emphasis the two services place on aviation safety based on where that responsibility
rests in the chain of command.
Army. All aviation personnel have responsibility for mishap
prevention but the Army identifies specific positions whose occupants have explicit
responsibility for aviation safety. The Secretary of the Army and his advisor, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment, have
responsibility at the Headquarters level. The commander of the Army Safety Center
oversees the Army Safety Program and the Director of Army Safety is in charge of the
Aviation Accident Prevention Program. Commanders at all levels are responsible for
aviation safety under their command. Advising the commander on safety issues is the
unit aviation safety officer, the flight surgeon, and the aviation maintenance officer who
is responsible for an aircraft preventive maintenance program. The aviator is at the core
of aviation accident prevention. At the installation and major command (MACOM)
levels, the command safety director is responsible for the management of the command
safety program and advises the MACOM commander on aviation safety issues
(Department of the Army, 1999b).
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Air Force. Like the Army, the Air Force has designated positions
and organizations responsible for safety as described in Air Force Policy Directive 91-2.
The Air Force Chief of Safety sets safety policy and guidance. The Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment oversees
occupational safety and health policy issues. Commanders must provide a safe working
environment by ensuring a mishap prevention program is in place. The safety focus of
the commander is the prevention of mishaps both on and off duty and incorporating
safety principles to accomplish the mission. All Air Force personnel are responsible for
safety by identifying and reporting hazards up the chain of command. Safety staffs at
various levels manage the commander's mishap prevention program. This includes the
safety office at wing level and the flight safety officer at the flying unit level. The Air
Force Safety Center has a wide range of responsibilities including mishap investigation,
data storage, tracking corrective actions, and evaluating unit safety programs
(Department of the Air Force 1993:2,3). Table 1 summarizes the Army-Air Force
leadership comparison.

Table 1. Army and Air Force Safety Responsibilities
Level
Headquarters
Safety Center
Major Command
Unit

Army
Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Installations,
Logistics and Environment
Director of Army Safety
Safety Director
Commanders
Aviation Safety Officers
Individuals
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Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, Installations, and
Environment
Air Force Chief of Safety
Safety Staffs
Commanders
Flight Safety Officers
Individuals

The Air Force has long realized the importance of the commander's role in
aviation safety. In 1987, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) published the Commander's
Guide for the Prevention of TAC Fighter Mishaps. A review of mishaps within the
command revealed that supervisory error was causal or contributed to 35% of the
mishaps between January 1980 and December 1985 (McGraw, 1987:1). The guide
addresses flying safety issues new squadron and wing commanders will face when they
begin their duties. It specifically addresses the fact that a burden of responsibility for the
safety and welfare of those under his command is placed upon hini. As then TAC
commander General Russ stated, the commander is not "one of the boys" anymore, he is
"they" (1987:3). He is the leader and must lead by example in all aspects of life. The
guide emphasizes that new commanders study and learn from the mistakes of previous
commanders. It also makes clear that the principles and issues addressed are not
exclusive to the fighter community but have application in other major commands and
the nonfighter aircraft community.
Mishap Investigation. Aircraft mishap investigation has been performed
ever since the Wright brothers suffered the crash of their aircraft at Fort Meyer, VA in
1909. It has long been noted within the aviation community that accurate and timely
mishap investigations can help prevent similar future mishaps. Over the years, the most
effective way to prevent mishaps has been through the mishap investigation and reporting
process. Both in civil and military aviation, a safety board convenes to find out what
caused a mishap and why and disseminates that information to help prevent similar
mishaps. The information goes to aircraft design and acquisition personnel who can then
incorporate modifications and safety features into the aircraft. The information also goes
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out to current users of the aircraft so that they can make any necessary changes to their
procedures.
In civilian aviation, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversees the
commercial and general aviation activities. When mishaps occur, however, the National
Transportation Safety Board, an agency independent from the FAA, investigates to
determine the cause and provides recommendations to the FAA for corrective action.
Since "public safety is the first priority in civil aviation," this independence has worked
well in terms of mishap rate reduction (Department of the Air Force, 1995:6).
In the military, each service has its own process for mishap investigation. Studies
have been done to determine whether an independent investigative board should be
established within DoD. One of the congressional taskings for the Defense Science
Board (DSB) was to "determine the need/value of a joint program to require a
standardized process for reporting and assessing the causes of accidents" (Department of
Defense, 1997:4). The DSB found that each service had its own appropriate process for
investigating, reporting, and assessing mishap causes. Although each service organized
and administered investigations differently, each service incorporated basic mishap
investigation principles adequately and therefore there would be no added value or need
for a joint program (1997:16,17). In its study of the same issue, the Blue Ribbon Panel
concluded that since the first priority for the military is combat efficiency, it would not be
in the military's best interest to have a separate investigative arm (Department of the Air
Force, 1995:6,7).
Advancement in Technology. In the early days of aviation, advancement
in technology made major contributions to reducing the mishap rate. As aircraft and their
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components have become more reliable, the proportion of mishaps due to poor design or
manufacture has decreased while the human error proportion has increased (Driskell and
Adams, 1992:3). Nevertheless, technology continues to advance, opening new
opportunities to help further reduce the proportion of mishaps due to aircraft failure. In
its report, the DSB recommended that the DoD provide funding for high priority flight
safety equipment as well as for research, design, development, test, and deployment of
new equipment. Furthermore, the DoD should use information technology to develop a
joint database of flight data recorder performance and maintenance information. This
shared resource could help prevent accidents through lessons learned from each of the
services (Department of Defense, 1997:ES-4,5).
Human Factors Programs. Since human error is the leading contributing
factor to the majority of DoD aviation mishaps, the service leaders have increased
emphasis on programs that aim to minimize human error. Two such programs are crew
resource management (CRM) and risk management (RM).
Crew Resource Management. The definition of CRM is "the
effective utilization of all available resources - equipment and people - to achieve safe,
efficient flight operations" (Driskell, 1992:8). Although military and commercial efforts
to heighten safety emphasis through CRM have been ongoing since the 1970s, a CRM
training program was not established in the Air Force until 1994. In its investigation, the
Blue Ribbon Panel found that CRM has been beneficial to the multi-member cockpits,
but its impact in the single seat fighter environment, where most of the Class A mishaps
occur, is unclear (Department of the Air Force, 1995:14).
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Risk Management. "Risk management is the process of
identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making
decisions that balance risk costs with mission benefits" (Department of the Army,
1998a: 1-1). It is a tool for the military leader to use to minimize risks and maximize
mission accomplishment. Although the military has practiced managing risks for years, it
has done so based on intuition and experience (Department of the Air Force, 1998:4).
While the concept of managing risks is not new to the military, RM formalizes that
process. The DSB recommended that the services make full use of risk management
practices as they provide the least costly means of reducing the mishap rates (Department
of Defense, 1997:31,32).
Summary. This section described the aviation safety factors pertinent to the
research. It presented both mishap cause and mishap prevention factors as found in a
review of the literature and described how those factors related to Army and Air Force
aviation safety. The mishap cause factors were: human factors, material failure,
environmental, and other. The mishap prevention factors were: leadership, mishap
investigation, technological advances, and human factor programs. Two human factor
programs, CRM and RM, were discussed but remainder of this literature review focuses
on risk management history, defines terms, and compares the Army and Air Force
implementation of risk management.

Risk Management History
The roots of risk management are embedded in the science of uncertainty:
probability. The 17th century French mathematicians, Blaise Pascal and Pierre De
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Fermat, are considered the founders of the study of probability (Barnett, 1996:363).
Since risk is the probability of a loss, risk management has been practiced in several
industries that involve high risk.
Insurance. "The risk at any given time equals the difference between the reserve
and the face of the policy" (Neilson, 1958). The insurance industry uses risk
management concepts to evaluate whether to offer insurance for someone, and if so, what
it will cost the insured. The higher the risk to the company, the higher the cost will be for
the insured.
Transportation. The transportation industry uses risk management principles to
determine routes when hauling hazardous materials. The goal is to transport hazardous
materials as quickly and as safely as possible in order to minimize the risk of exposure to
the environment. Factors considered include type and quantity of material, mode of
transport, starting point, destination, and population density. Models have been
developed that assign weight to the various factors to help decide the route (Helander,
1997:216-226).
Government. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has
integrated risk management into their strategic planning. Historically, NASA has used
reliability engineering principles to curb risks. Ebling defines reliability engineering.
The overall objective of reliability engineering is to ensure that the final
product will be both economically reliable and reliably safe....Reliably
safe requires designing sufficient reliability into the product to ensure that
the probability of accidents, injury, or death resulting from a product
failure is within an acceptable limit. (Ebling, 1997:429-430)
RM is a decision-making process based on a cost-benefit analysis of known hazards and
desired objectives. Reliability engineering, however, is an engineering process based on
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the probability of design failure. An RM decision-maker should take into account any
reliability information available to make the best decision. While not minimizing
reliability engineering techniques, NASA is now focusing efforts on managing the risks
of systems interaction. NASA's motivation for mission success stems from the fact that,
like the military, its budget is decreasing yet more missions are demanded (Lalli,
1996:355). NASA must determine ways of ensuring reliable missions. The answer is
through identifying the hazards and mitigating the risks associated with those hazards,
risk management.
The background of risk management has been presented, but before discussing the
specifics of RM in the Army and Air Force, some terms need to be defined.

Definitions
Risk. Since this discussion regards both the Army and Air Force, it is important
to define the terminology that will be used throughout. At the heart of military aviation
mishap reduction and risk management is the term risk. Webster's dictionary defines risk
as a "hazard; danger; peril; exposure to loss, injury, disadvantage, or destruction"
(Neilson, 1958). The Army defines risk as the "chance of hazard or bad consequences;
the probability of exposure to chance of injury or loss from a hazard; risk level is
expressed in terms of hazard probability and severity" (Department of the Army, 1998a).
The Air Force defines risk as "an expression of consequences in terms of the probability
of an event occurring, the severity of the event and the exposure of personnel or resources
to potential loss or harm" (Department of the Air Force, 1998a:37). Both the Army and
Air Force emphasize the risk elements of probability, severity, and exposure. Despite
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minor wording differences, there is no significant difference in definitions of risk
between the services. All three definitions are in general agreement.
Risk Management. Although there is minimal DoD-level risk management
guidance for the services, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations and Joint Pub 5-0,
Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, do allude to the practice of risk management
principles. Since each service is responsible for its own safety program and safety and
risk are closely related, each service has developed its own guidelines and instructions for
governing its risk management programs. The Army uses the term risk management
(RM) and defines it as "the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising
from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission
benefits" (Department of the Army, 1998a:G-3). The Air Force uses the term operational
risk management (ORM) and defines it as "a logic-based, common sense approach to
making calculated decisions on human, materiel, and environmental factors before,
during and after Air Force mission activities and operations" (Department of the Air
Force, 1997:1). The term used in this paper (RM vs. ORM) depends on which service is
under discussion. There is essentially no difference between these definitions in that they
both state that risk management is a decision making process.
RM Principles. The Army's RM principles are 1) accept no unnecessary risks, 2)
make risk decisions at the appropriate level to establish clear accountability, and 3)
accept risk when benefits outweigh the costs (Department of the Army, 1998:1-3). The
Air Force adds a fourth principle: integrate ORM into Air Force doctrine and planning at
all levels (Department of the Air Force, 1998a:6).
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RM Process. The Army's RM process consists of five steps: 1) identify hazards,
2) assess hazards to determine risks, 3) develop controls and make risk decision, 4)
implement controls, 5) supervise and evaluate (Department of the Army, 1998a:2-0).
The only difference between the Army and Air Force risk management process is that the
Air Force splits the Army's third step into two steps. Consequently, the Army uses a
five-step process and the Air Force uses a six-step process.
DODI 6055.7 defines the following flight mishap terms:
Flight and Flight-Related Mishap. An aircraft flight or flight-related mishap
occurs when intent to fly exists. Specifically, a flight mishap occurs when "there is
reportable damage to the aircraft itself." A flight-related mishap occurs when there is "no
reportable damage to the aircraft itself, but the mishap involves fatality, injury.. .or other
property damage." Until 1983, the Army flight mishap rate was calculated based on both
flight and flight-related mishaps. Beginning in 1984, the Army flight mishap rate was
calculated based on flight mishaps only.
Intent for Flieht. Intent for flight is assumed during the time from takeoff brake
release or power application until landing is completed.
Mishap Categories. Mishaps are categorized according to their severity in terms
of dollar value of damage and personal injury. A Class A mishap involves over $1
million in property damage, a destroyed aircraft, or loss of life or permanent total
disability. A Class B mishap involves over $200,000 but less than $1,000,000 in property
damage or permanent partial disability or when five or more personnel are inpatient
hospitalized. A Class C mishap involves over $10,000 but less than $200,000 in property
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damage or injury causing loss of time from work beyond the day or shift upon which it
occurred.
Mishap Rate. The mishap rate is the number of mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.

Risk Management Implementation
A hypothesis of this research is that the Air Force implementation of ORM is
significantly different from the Army's implementation of RM. If this is not true, and the
Army aviation mishap rate saw a significant reduction due to RM application, then the
Air Force may also see a similar reduction in its mishap rate. Implementation of RM into
the Army and of ORM into the Air Force was evaluated using three criteria: published
directives, responsibility, and training.
Army. The Army officially began the implementation of RM in 1987. AR 38510, The Armv Safety Program, addressed the integration of risk management throughout
the Army: "Decision-makers at every level will employ risk management approaches to
effectively preclude unacceptable risk to the safety of personnel and property"
(Department of the Army, 1999c). According to Stearns, RM was "successfully
integrated into the Army's training and operational process" (Stearns, 1990:32).
In 1997, the Secretary of the Army formally established responsibilities for the
full integration of RM (Department of the Army, 1998b). At first RM was a safety
officer function applicable to the training and operational areas, particularly the aviation
community (Department of the Army, 1998a:iii). However, FM 100-14, Risk
Management the Army manual for the application of RM, clearly places the
responsibility of RM integration on commanders, leaders, staffs, and individuals. Further
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RM integration guidance stipulates that "HQDA (Headquarters, Department of the Army)
Principal Officials and MACOM (major command) commanders are designated
integrating agents" (Army Safety Center, 1999a).
Risk management was incorporated into the Army's material acquisition process
in the late 1980's and into its doctrine, training, and professional military education in the
early 1990's (Van Aalten, 1999). The Army attributes, in part, its recent aviation mishap
reduction success to the aviation safety officers who applied RM techniques (Army
Safety Center, 1999b). However, in the Army's recent integration effort, it has
recognized the need for a cadre of trained safety personnel skilled in being able to
broadly apply RM techniques (Army Safety Center, 1999b). The goal is to integrate RM
practice and training for all individuals both on- and off- duty in order that it become
second nature and embedded in the Army culture (Department of the Army, 1998a:iii).
Air Force. On 2 Sep 96, the Air Force Chief of Staff ordered the implementation
of ORM to begin. Full implementation through computer-based awareness training on an
individual level was completed 1 Oct 98. Thus, Air Force ORM is in its infancy. AFI
91-213, "Operational Risk Management (ORM) Program," established the requirement to
incorporate ORM programs throughout the Air Force and outlines their description,
management, and development. Each major command is responsible for developing and
implementing its own ORM programs. AFPAM 91-215, "Operational Risk Management
(ORM) Guidelines and Tools," describes how to integrate and execute the ORM process.
While it is the responsibility of the major commands to develop and implement its
own programs, it is the responsibility of commanders at all levels, supervisors, and
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individuals to execute the practice of ORM both on- and off- duty (Department of the Air
Force, 1998a:4).
While the Army's initial emphasis was to apply RM through the commanders in
the operational and training areas, from the start the Air Force took a more holistic
approach with application in all areas. The emphasis in the Air Force has been the
implementation of ORM through training and education from the top down. There are
four levels of training: awareness, mission and workplace specific, supervisor, and ORM
advisor. The Air Force provides training to a cadre of major command safety
professionals who, in turn, provide training and guidance at the wing levels. ORM has
also begun to be taught in the initial stages of an individual's career beginning with basic
military training and officer commissioning sources. It is also taught at the various
technical schools and professional military education courses throughout one's career
(Department of the Air Force, 1997:4-5).
While the Army and Air Force have taken different tracks to the same goal, it
does not appear that their risk management implementations have been significantly
different. Both services have established a trained cadre of risk management personnel
and are integrating the philosophy at all levels for all individuals to apply both on- and
off- duty. It is likely that the Air Force learned much from the Army before launching its
ORM program.
Summary. This section examined the implementation of RM in the Army and
ORM in the Air Force using three criteria: published directives, responsibility, and
training. The Army began implementation in 1987 and focused its implementation
efforts in the acquisition, operational, and training areas. It later expanded RM
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implementation into its doctrine and educational process. The Air Force began
implementation in 1996 and completed awareness training in 1998. From its inception,
ORM was implemented into all areas. While RM implementation has progressed at
different rates for each service, both the Army and Air Force are taking similar steps to
arrive at the same goal: mishap prevention, both on- and off- duty. Thus, the
implementation procedures do not appear to be significantly different.

Summary and Conclusions
This chapter provided a review of the aviation safety factors as revealed in the
literature, including those related to mishap cause and prevention. A history of risk
management was discussed as well as the definitions of risk management terms. How the
Army and Air Force have implemented risk management concepts into their operations
was examined. Based on this review, it appears that the focus of aviation mishap
reduction is centered on the application of risk management. The Army has put much
effort into reducing its mishaps through RM techniques and its mishap rate has declined.
Was this decline due to RM application? The next chapter will describe how the
available data was analyzed and may help answer this question.
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m. Methodology, Results, and Analysis

Overview
This chapter is the heart of the research project. It describes the data collected
and reviews the possible sources of time series invalidity. The primary focus of this
chapter, however, is a presentation of the methodology, results, and analysis that address
the investigative questions posed in Chapter I.

Data Collection and Description
To conduct the analysis, aviation safety data was acquired from both the Army
and Air Force.
Army. The Army Safety Center (ASC) provided Class A and Class A-C data
(rates and numbers of mishaps) from 1973 to 1998 but the individual Class B and C data
were not available. Additionally, Class A, B, and C data by aircraft type from 1988-1998
were provided. By extracting the Class A data out of the Class A-C data, a separate
category of Class B-C mishaps was constructed. The ASC also provided flight mishap
causal data for fiscal years 1990 to 1998. The data include aircraft type, class, and cause
category (human error, materiel failure, and environmental) for each year. Since Class
A-C mishap rates include events in the B-C category, only Class A and Class B-C
category mishap rates were analyzed. Table 2 summarizes the Army data collected.
The mishap rates prior to and including 1983 were computed based on flight and flightrelated mishaps. Since 1984, however, rates have been computed based on flight mishaps
only. The mishap rate based on flight and flight-related mishaps will be higher than if
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Table 2. Army Data Summary
FY
73-87

Class A Rate
YES

Class A-C Rate
YES

ByMTDS
NO

88-98
90-98

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

# of Mishaps
YES
(Class A only)
YES
YES

Causes
NO
NO
YES

flight mishaps only are considered in the calculation. This confound is addressed later in
this chapter.
Since the Army implemented RM in 1987, the data cover a period before and
after implementation although causal information dates back only to 1990. The Army
data is presented in Appendix A.
Air Force. The Air Force Safety Center provided flight mishap causal data for
fiscal years 1993 to 1998. Since the Air Force completed initial ORM implementation in
1998, the data only cover the period before implementation. The data include aircraft
type, accountable category, responsible agent, and reason for each year. As described in
Chapter II, the reasons are further broken down into people, parts, paper, and other
categories. The people category is of interest to this research and corresponds to the
Army's human error category. Class A data from 1947-1997 and Class A and B data by
aircraft type from 1972-1998 were obtained from the Air Force Safety Center World
Wide Web site. The Air Force data and related information are presented in Appendix B.

Sources of Time Series Invalidity
This research treats the mishap rate as the response variable and risk management
as the treatment. Given that time series data is evaluated in this research, care must be
taken to assess the effect of threats to internal and external validity. Campbell and
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Stanley describe various types of experimental designs and identify the associated
sources of threat to their internal and external validity (Campbell, 1963). A more
rigorous discussion of the threats is found in Cooper and Emory (1995:357-361). This
section specifically identifies the threats to the evaluation of aviation mishap rate data as
it relates to the implementation of risk management in the Army and Air Force.
Internal Validity. Campbell and Stanley identify eight potential threats to internal
validity for a time series design study (Campbell, 1963:40). Only the failure to control
history, however, is considered a strong threat relative to the other seven sources.
History. For a time series study, history is the single largest threat to
internal validity. It is possible that factors other than that being tested caused a change to
occur. As stated in Chapter II, there are numerous reasons for an aviation mishap and at
least as many ways of prevention. Four major aviation mishap prevention factors were
identified in Chapter II: leadership, mishap investigation, advancement in technology,
and crew resource management, a human factors program. Risk management, also a
human factors program, is only one way of preventing mishaps and it may or may not
have been a factor in any significant change in the Army's aviation mishap rate in recent
years. These mishap prevention factors are together considered responsible for any trend
in the mishap rate before 1987. If there were any changes in the trend after 1987, it
would first have to be attributed to any identifiable changes in those factors if they were
contemporaneous with RM (1986-1988). After that, any change left over can be
attributed to the treatment of RM. A brief historical overview of each mishap prevention
factor was conducted to examine any confounds that may exist.
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Leadership History. The Army recognizes that aviation safety can
be improved through proper leadership. In 1984 the Director of Army Safety became a
general officer position to report directly to the Army Chief of Staff (Hicks, 1999).
Additionally, the Army has conducted much research to continuously improve the
leadership development of its members. In 1986, the Noncommissioned Officer
Professional Development Study was conducted. In 1987, the Army Chief of Staff
directed that the Deputy Commandant, Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
conduct a comprehensive leader development study. The Leader Development Support
System, in use today, was established in 1989 as a direct result of the CGSC study. In
1991 the Leader Development Investment Strategy study was performed to address issues
facing the rapidly downsizing Army (Department of the Army, 1999d). Currently, the
Army Safety Center is leading the Aviation Safety Investment Strategy. This effort is
examining mishaps by aircraft type and is developing strategies to reduce mishaps
(Hicks, 1999).
Mishap Investigation History. Mishap investigation has also been
considered to improve aviation safety. In its continuing effort to prevent aircrew injuries,
the Army's Aeromedical Research Laboratory (AARL) established the Aviation Life
Support Equipment Retrieval Program (ALSERP) in 1972. Members from the AARL
often participate in mishap investigations. By retrieving and evaluating equipment
involved in mishaps, the AARL provides critical design criteria for improved life support
equipment. Specifically, three types of helmets have been fielded since 1972: the SPH-4
Mod (1978), the SPH-4B (1991), and the HGU-56/P (1995). "Each of these helmets
incorporate incremental improvements designed or intended to reduce or prevent injury"
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(Voisine, 1996:3). Flight data recorders are useful in mishap investigation because their
data can be downloaded into a computer and the mission can be "flown" again.
Investigators can then determine what the aircraft was doing before and during the
mishap sequence. In 1986, the UH-60A Black Hawk was the first Army aircraft have
flight data recorders installed (Army Weaponry and Equipment, 1986:387). Flight data
recorder installation is ongoing today (Hicks, 1999). Changes in the composition of
mishap investigation teams have also taken place. In the late 1980's the Army Safety
Center representation on mishap investigations dropped from three to two. The civilian
safety specialist was removed due to resource constraints (Hicks, 1999). In the mid1990's, the ASC information requirement for Class C mishap reporting was reduced to
the Abbreviated Aviation Accident Report. This policy is currently being re-evaluated to
ensure that all necessary data is archived (Hicks, 1999).
Technology Advancement History. Technology advancements
have made Army aviation relatively safer over the years. Fielding new or modified
aircraft with improved safety features might contribute toward mishap reduction. In 1984
the first CH-47D Chinook was delivered. It is an upgrade from the A, B, and C models
(Army Weaponry and Equipment, 1986:392). The UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter was
fielded between 1978 and 1989. The aircraft include crashworthy armored crew seats
(1986:387). In 1986 the first AH-64A Apache attack helicopter was delivered to Ft.
Hood, TX (1986:387). Also in 1986, the first modernized AH-1S Cobra was delivered
through the Cobra Fleet Life Extension Program. One if the program's key features was a
new drive shaft designed to improve safety (1986:389). In 1990, the H-6-530 aircraft
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began a no tail rotor (Notar) system modification. One effect of removing the tail rotor
was improved safety margins due to weight and power savings (Brown, 1990:44-45).
CRM History. As stated in Chapter II, research regarding the
human factor program of crew resource management (CRM) has been ongoing since the
1970s. The Army, recognizing the need to address crew errors, first introduced a 6-8
hour block of CRM-type training to helicopter pilot candidates in 1983. In 1984, the
training was revised to a two hour block and retitled Dynamics of Aircrew Coordination
Training. In 1987, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Research
Institute (ART) to initiate a research and development program to reduce accident rates
through various means including training. ARI's subsequent research of aviation
accidents showed that the majority of human error-related accidents involved crew
coordination errors (Simon, 1992:1-1). In 1988, the Army Safety Center (ASC)
incorporated aircrew coordination training (ACT) into its Aviation Safety Officer Course.
From 1990 to 1992 the ARI, the Army Aviation Center, and the Dynamics Research
Corporation coordinated their efforts to conduct aircrew coordination studies and revise
aircrew training manuals. The research culminated in aircrew coordination training and
evaluation materials exportable to the field. ACT was officially implemented Army-wide
in 1994 (Directorate, 1998). The "central feature of the Army's crew coordination
training is that it is designed to reduce the number of accidents (Simon, 1995:45).
These historical events could confound any impact RM may have had on reducing
the mishap rates. The inability to quantify these major contributors to mishap prevention
interferes with quantifying the effectiveness of risk management. However, there may be
a correlation between the presence of RM implementation and the aviation mishap rate.
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Maturation. Maturation concerns the effect time has on the subjects of the
experiment. Since this research covers a relatively long period, those whose performance
can affect the mishap rate may have matured over that time. This maturation may be in
the form of aviation experience, training, and using safer equipment as described in
Chapter II. Concerning maturation after RM implementation, it is assumed that the more
Army aviators practice RM, the more likely the mishap rate would decrease. In this
sense, the threat of maturation is similar to the threat of history.
Testing. If subjects are given a test, it is likely that a learning effect will
occur that will influence scores of a second test on the same material. For this research, it
was not possible to give a series of tests in this manner. Therefore, the testing threat to
internal validity is low.
Instrumentation. Instrumentation concerns the way measurements are
taken to obtain results. If changes are made in instrumentation, it is likely that the results
will not be consistent. In this research, the way the mishap rate was calculated did
change in 1984. This issue will be addressed in the methodology section.
Selection. The selection of subjects for control and experimental groups is
important in that they need to be equivalent to minimize the threat to internal validity. In
this research, the Army is the experimental group and the Air Force is the control group.
It is true that their aviation components are not equivalent in every respect but, as was
discussed in Chapter II, there is enough similarity concerning RM/ORM that this threat
can be considered minimal.
Regression. The regression factor is in effect when groups are selected
based on extremely high or low results. When tested after a treatment, the extreme
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results move toward their expected value. For this research, regression analysis is
performed. As a result, extreme mishap rates, outliers, are evaluated and removed as
necessary. The internal threat of regression is minimal.
Experimental Mortality. This threat concerns the situation where, as an
experiment continues, subjects are likely to drop out, thus affecting the results. In this
study, it is assumed that attrition is not a problem because if one member of the aviation
community leaves, another of similar quality will replace him. Hence, this threat to
internal validity is minimal.
Interaction. The effect of interaction between any of the previous seven
threats to internal validity can be confounded with the effect of a treatment, X. In this
study, maturation and history have the potential to confound the impact of RM.
However, since the duration of the experiment is relatively long, maturation and history
could be considered one threat. The other five threats are not likely to interact.
Therefore, the threat of interaction is minimal.
External Validity. External validity concerns the ability to generalize results to
other populations. Both Campbell and Emory list three major threats to the external
validity of an experiment where X represents the treatment (in this case, RM): 1)
interaction of testing and X, 2) interaction of selection and X, and 3) reactive
arrangements.
Interaction of Testing and RM. This threat can be high if a pretest
occurred before X. How the subjects respond to X because of previous exposure can
confound the results. In this research, it is assumed that no testing or formalized practice
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of RM occurred in Army aviation before RM implementation occurred in 1987.
Therefore, this threat is considered minimal to the generalizability of the research results.
Interaction of Selection and RM. This threat concerns how subjects are
selected from a population for a test, or in this case the treatment of RM, and the
generalizability of the results. For this research, the population of subjects is the Army
aviation and safety community. The results, then, will be generalizable to the Army.
However, as presented in Chapter I, the basic research question of this thesis is to
determine if the Air Force can expect its mishap rate to significantly decline after ORM
implementation. It is not the purpose to directly compare Army and Air Force mishap
rates but to predict the effect ORM may have on the Air Force aviation mishap rate based
on the effect RM may have had on the Army aviation mishap rate. It is, then, the
intention to be able to generalize the results to the Air Force. This generalization can not
be based on statistical results alone but in conjunction with those investigative questions
addressed in Chapter II. Therefore, the threat of interaction of selection and RM is
considered minimal to the generalizability of the research results.
Reactive Arrangements. This threat concerns the effect that the
environment in which testing occurs may have on external validity. If testing is
performed in an artificial environment separate from it original population, one may not
be able to validly generalize to that population. In this research, neither the Army nor Air
Force flying environments are artificial settings in which to test RM/ORM. The Army
flying environment may be significantly different from that of the Air Force. However,
since RM/ORM is a decision-making process applicable to any flying situation, it is
assumed that those in the aviation community apply RM/ORM appropriately to their
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Situation. Therefore, the threat of reactive arrangement is considered minimal to the
generalizability of the research results.
Summary. This section addressed the threats to both internal and external validity
to the research. The major threat to its internal validity is history. Various historical
events associated with aviation mishap prevention and contemporaneous with RM were
presented which could confound the effect RM may have had on the mishap rate. Since
the manner in which the mishap rate was calculated changed in 1984, instrumentation
could also influence the effect RM may have had on the mishap rate.

Methodology, Results, and Analysis
Overview. Chapter I presented five investigative questions. The first two were
answered in Chapter II. The remaining three are addressed in this chapter using
statistical analysis. The questions are:
1) Was there a significant difference in the Army aircraft mishap rates after the
implementation of RM? (Investigative Question 3).
2) If there was a significant difference, was the change due to the implementation
of RM? (Investigative Question 3a).
3) If there was a significant difference in the mishap rate, how much of an effect
was the implementation of RM? (Investigative Question 3b).
For each question, the methodology is first presented followed by the results and
an analysis of the results. All statistical tests were performed using JMP® Version 3 and
Mathcad 7. The Army data analyzed is found in Appendix A and presented graphically
in Figures 3 and 4. The 1991 data point was removed from the analysis because the
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relatively high 1991 Class A mishap rate can be attributed to the preparation for and
execution of Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Additionally, through statistical analysis,
the data point was found to be an outlier for the Class A mishap rate (Appendix C).

Figure 3. Army Class A Aviation Mishap Rate
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Figure 4. Army Class B-C Aviation Mishap Rate
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After the 1991 data point was removed, the remaining data was shown to be from a
normal distribution (Appendix D). The data point was not an outlier in the B-C category
(Appendix E); however, it was removed to keep the analysis consistent.
Investigative Question 3. Was there a significant difference in the Army aircraft
mishap rates after the implementation of RM? To address this question, two statistical
tests were performed: 1) comparison of means test, and 2) a comparison of variances.
Comparison of Means.
Methodology. Just looking at Figures 3 and 4, one can intuitively
say that the rates after 1987 are lower than those before 1987. However, to answer this
question statistically, a comparison of means test for small samples was considered
according to McClave (372-378). The means compared would be for the periods 19731987 (before RM) and 1988-1998 (after RM) for both Class A and Class B-C mishap
rates. Three assumptions must be met for this test to be valid. The first assumption is
that both sampled populations must have relative frequency distributions that are
approximately normal. This assumption is satisfied through an analysis of the residuals
(Appendix D and E). The second assumption is that the samples are randomly and
independently selected from the population. To satisfy this assumption, both samples
would be randomly and independently selected from the population in that all data points
in the population except the outlier could be used in the analysis. The third assumption is
that the population variances are equal. To attempt to satisfy this assumption, an analysis
of the population variances of the values could be performed. However, this approach
cannot satisfy this assumption because this research is dealing with time series data. As a
result, the direct comparison of means test is not appropriate.
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The problem with performing a direct comparison of means is that when time
series data is analyzed, trend components must be removed before any mean analysis can
be performed. If the time series is stationary, the values will "fluctuate with constant
variation around a constant mean" (Bowerman, 1987:26). Since time series data is
considered in this research and the mishap rate processes do not appear to be stationary,
the direct comparison of means is an inappropriate test for this data. A transformation of
the data to stationarity, however, does permit a comparison of means.
Since the mishap rate is expressed as a percentage (as defined in Chapter II), a
way to transform the data into a form that is suitable for comparison of means is to
compute the percentage period index (PPI) using the procedure described in Makridakis
(1983:171). PPI is a period-to-period (in this case year-to-year) percentage change. A
difference of means test comparing the mean PPI for each period is then possible. If the
means are different, it indicates that a process change has occurred.
To run the test, the PPI of the first value in the data set is set equal to a constant to
provide an order of magnitude. Each PPI thereafter is determined by computing the ratio
of the current rate to the previous rate and multiplying the ratio by the constant. In
general:
PPI = [(Ratei+i)/ (Rate; )]xC

fromi=lton

(1)

where C = 10. The hypotheses for the test were:
Ho: the means are equal
Ha: the means are not equal
To reject the null hypothesis in the comparison of means t-test, the t-statistic must be
greater than the t-critical value. The level of significance for the t-test was a = .05.
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Results. Table 3 summarizes the results of the PPI transformation
that are presented in Appendix F.

Table 3. Percentage Period Index Results
Year
Mean PPI t-crit
t-stat Reject Null?
1973-1987
9.73
1.714
.198
No
1988-1998
9.92
1973-1987
9.32
1.714 1.601
No
1988-1998
11.02

Class
A
B-C

The results showed that there is enough evidence to suggest that the mean PPIs
for both Class A and Class B-C mishap rate categories were not significantly different at
the a = .05 level of significance. Figures 5 and 6 present the PPIs graphically for both
Class A and Class B-C categories respectively.
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Figure 5. Class A Period Percentage Index
Analysis. Since there was no significant difference in the mean PPIs
for both categories, the mean percentage change of the mishap rate from year to year can
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be considered the same for both periods. This indicates that the process to reduce the
mishap rate has not changed since 1987.
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Figure 6. Class B-C Period Percentage Index
Comparison of VariancesMethodology. As discussed earlier, it is not appropriate to
compare the variances of trended data. However, it is appropriate and useful to compare
the variances of the residuals of the mishap rate values regressed against the fiscal year.
Since the mean of the residuals is zero, a comparison between the variances of the
residuals is possible. A change in variance of the population of the residuals from one
period to the next will at least determine if a process change occurred. In looking at
Figures 3 and 4, it would be reasonable to expect the variance of the residuals for the
Class B-C mishap rate to be different as clearly a process change has occurred around
1987. A difference in variance is not as apparent for the Class A category.
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A comparison of the variances of the residuals of the mishap rate values for the
time periods 1973-1987 (before RM) and 1988-1998 (after RM) for both Class A and
Class B-C mishap categories was performed as described in McClave (1998:408-415).
The F-statistic is computed by placing the larger variance as the numerator and the
smaller as the denominator. The critical F value is determined based on the numerator
and denominator degrees of freedom. If the residual variances are the same, one can
conclude that there has been no process change. The hypotheses for the test were:
Ho: The residual variances are equal
Ha: The residual variances are not equal
If the F-statistic is greater than the critical F value, then the F-statistic falls in the
rejection region and the null hypothesis is rejected. This concept is illustrated in Figure
7.
/(F)

0

F«

F

Figure 7. F-Distribution (McClave, 1998:410)
Results. The results of the comparison of variance test are
presented in Appendix G and summarized in Table 4. Since the F-statistic for the Class
A mishap rate did not fall in the rejection region, the null hypothesis is not rejected. The
residual variances are equal. Since the F-statistic for the Class B-C mishap rate did fall
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Table 4. Variance Test Results
Class
A
B-C

Year
1973-1987
1988-1998
1973-1987
1988-1998

Variance
.115
.080
10.529
.811

F-crit
3.803

F-stat
1.435

Reject Null?
No

3.803

12.983

Yes

in the rejection region, the null hypothesis is rejected. The variances are not equal.
Analysis. Since the residual variances for the Class A mishap rate
category are equal, there is not enough evidence to conclude that a process change has
occurred. However, for the Class B-C category, since the residual variances were not
equal, there is enough evidence to conclude that a process change has occurred. Since
RM was instituted in 1987, this is the result expected from having reviewed Figure 4.
Summary. Investigative question 3 asked whether there was significant
difference in the mishap rate after the implementation of RM. A difference of means test
was performed on the percentage period indexes for both mishap rate categories. The
results showed no significant difference in the mean PPI for either category. This
indicated that no process change had occurred. A comparison of the variances of the
residuals of the mishap rates was then performed to confirm the absence of a process
change. The results confirmed that for the Class A mishap category, no process change
was evident. However, for the Class B-C mishap category, a process change was evident.
A more powerful method of determining whether there was significant change in the
mishap rates is to employ discontinuous piecewise linear regression. The procedure will
simultaneously address whether the process change as found in the Class B-C category
was due to the implementation of RM.
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Investigative Question 3a. If there was a significant difference, was the change
due to the implementation of RM?
Methodology. To address this question, discontinuous piecewise linear
regression was performed for the periods 1973-1998. Discontinuous piecewise linear
regression is used to determine if a slope and/or intercept change has occurred at a
particular break point or points (Neter, 1996:474-478). A model with two variables and a
break point, C, would look like this:
E(MR) = ßo + ßi*Xi + ß2*(X,-C)*X2 + ß3*X2

(2)

where ß0 is the Y-axis intercept, ßi is the slope of the regression line for the period before
treatment C, ßi+ß2 is the slope of the regression line for the period after C, and ß3 is the
jump in intercept at C. Figure 8 illustrates this concept.

E(Y) = (ß0-Cß2+ß3)+(ß1+ß2)X1
-Cß2+ß3

E(Y) = ß0 + ßX,

0
C
X
Figure 8. Discontinuous Piecewise Linear Regression Response Function
(Neter, 1996:478)
If there is no significant change in the slope of the regression line at point C, then one
would expect ß2 to be zero. Similarly, if there is no significant change in the intercept at
C, one would expect ß3 to be zero.
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Typically, with a process or policy change, one would expect to see a significant
change in the data results if the policy was effective. An effective treatment would
produce a shift in slope and/or intercept. A shift in intercept with no change in slope or a
change in slope with no change in intercept could reveal whether the treatment caused a
significant change in the process (Campbell, 1963:43).
Since Army risk management began in 1987, one might expect to see its effect
evidenced by a downward shift in the intercept and/or an increased negative slope in the
mishap rate regression line after 1987.
The full model consisted of two variables: FY and RM. FY is the fiscal year.
RM represents the presence of risk management. From 1973-1987 RM = 0 and from
1988-1998 RM = 1. The breakpoint, C, is 87. The full model was as follows:
E(MR) = ßo + ßi*FY + ß2 *(FY-87)*RM + ß3*RM

(3)

where ßo is the Y-axis intercept, ßi is the slope of the regression line for the period 19731987, ßi+ß2 is the slope of the regression line for the period 1988-1998, and ß3 is the
jump in intercept between 1987 and 1988. As a result, three hypotheses were made for
each mishap category (A, and B-C). The first hypothesis was:
Ho: ßi = ß2 = ß3 = 0
Ha: Theß's*0
The significance of the ßi and ß3 terms can be directly determined by their p-values from
the overall F-test results of the full model. However, a partial F-test must be performed
on the reduced model to determine the significance of the slope of the second regression
line, ßi + ß2. As a result, the second hypothesis was:
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Ho: ßi + ß2 = 0
Ha: ßi + ß2*0
Additionally, to determine if the slopes of the two regression lines are significantly
different from each other, a second partial F-test must be performed. If ß2 is zero, then
the slope of the second line will not be significantly different from the slope of the first
line. Hence, the third hypothesis was:
Ho: ß2 = 0
Ha: ß2*0
The results and analysis of the Class A mishap category are first presented followed by
those in the Class B-C mishap category. All tests were performed at an a = .05 level of
significance.
Class A Mishap Category.
Results. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the discontinuous piecewise
linear regression overall and partial F-test results respectively for the Class A mishap
category. With the given p-values, the overall F-test indicates that 1) the slope of the first
line, ßi, is significantly different from zero and 2) that there is no significant jump at
1987. The partial F-tests on the reduced model indicate that 1) the slope of the second
line, ßi+ß2, is significantly different from zero, and 2) the slopes of the regression
Table 5. Overall F-test Results: Class A Mishap Category
Term
Intercept
FY
(FY-87)xRM
RM

Beta
ßo
ßi

ß2
ß3

Beta
Coefficients
11.016
-.102
.011
-.128
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P-Value
.0001
.0001
.7672
.6525

Reject Null?
N/A
Yes
N/A
No

Table 6. Partial F-test Results: Class A Mishap Category
Beta
ßi+ß2

h

Slope of Line
1988-1998
-.091
N/A

Fcrit

F.stat

4.325
4.325

7.772
.09

Reject Null?
Yes
No

lines are not significantly different from one another. Figure 9 shows the discontinuous
piecewise linear regression for the Class A mishap rate. The graph suggests a continuous
downward trend in the Class A mishap rate.
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Figure 9. Class A Mishap Rate (Risk Management)
Analysis. Since there was no shift in the regression line at 1987
and the slopes of the two regression lines are not significantly different, there is no
indication that the presence of RM has had any effect on the Class A mishap rate. These
results confirm the finding of Investigative Question 3 that no process change has
appeared to have occurred in the Class A mishap rate category.
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Class B-C Mishap Category.
Results. Tables 7 and 8 summarize the discontinuous piecewise
linear regression overall and partial F-test results respectively for the Class B-C mishap
category.

Table 7. Overall F-test Results: Class B-C Mishap Category
Term
Intercept
FY
(FY-87)xRM
RM

Beta

ßo
ßi

ß2
ß3

Beta
Coefficients
101.495
-1.100
1.541
-2.060

P-Value
.0001
.0001
.0001
.3602

Reject Null?
Yes
Yes
N/A
No

Table 8. Partial F-test Results: Class B-C Mishap Category
Slope of Line
Beta
1988-1998
Reject Null?
Fcrit
Fstat
.441
4.844
1.573
No
ßi+ß2
N/A
4.325 26.497
Yes
ß2
With the given p-values, the overall F-test indicates that 1) the slope of the first line, ßi,
is significantly different from zero and 2) that there is no significant jump at 1987. The
partial F-tests on the reduced model indicate that 1) the slope of the second line, ßi+ß2, is
not significantly different from zero, and 2) that the slopes of the regression lines are
significantly different from one another. Figure 10 shows the discontinuous piecewise
linear regression for the Class B-C mishap rate. The graph suggests an upward trend in
the Class B-C mishap rate category since 1987.
Analysis. In the comparison of variances performed earlier, a
process change was confirmed for the Class B-C category. If this change were due to
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RM, a shift in the regression line at 1987 and/or an increased negative slope of the second
regression line after 1987 would indicate that RM effected this change. However, since

\::mtä$*ü

Figure 1Q. Class B-C Mishap Rate (Risk Management)
there was no shift and the slope of the regression line after 1987 actually reversed course
and became positive, it can be said, at the least, that RM has not had its intended effect.
There may be several possibilities for this. It is possible that, with the emphasis on safety
that RM brings with it, a stricter reporting policy of Class B and C mishaps may have
been perceived by commanders. It is also possible that the flight-related confound
analyzed in the next section affected mishap reporting. In any event, the mishap cause
factors discussed in Chapter II outweighed the mishap prevention factors for reasons
beyond the scope of this research.
Summary. Investigative Question 3a asked whether any significant difference
found in Investigative Question 3 was due to RM. Discontinuous piecewise linear
regression analysis was employed to address this question. For the Class A mishap
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category, the test reinforced the previous rinding that no process change occurred. The
conclusion is that RM has not affected the Class A mishap rate. For the Class B-C
mishap category, the test confirmed a process change identified in previous analysis. In
fact, since 1987, the mishap rates have increased. Several possibilities for this occurrence
were discussed.
Investigative Question 3b. If there was a significant difference in the mishap rate,
how much of an effect was the implementation of RM?
Although the test performed for Investigative Question 3a found a potential
significant difference (change in slope) in the Class B-C mishap rate since RM
implementation, it does not appear that RM has had its intended effect. This may be
influenced by the confounding effect of flight-related mishaps in the rate calculation
discovered during data collection. How much of an effect this confound has had on the
mishap rate may change the determination of how much of an effect RM has had on the
mishap rate.
Methodology. The previous analysis for the effect of RM after 1987
ignored the fact that flight-related data were included in the mishap rate calculation for
the period 1973-1983. In order to test the impact of the confounding effect this may have
had on the rate calculation, discontinuous piecewise linear regression analysis was
performed for the period 1973-1987 for both mishap categories. The breakpoint, C, was
84. The two variables for test one were FY and FR. FR represented the presence of
flight-related mishaps included in the mishap rate calculation. The full model of the
expected value of the mishap rate was as follows:
E(MR) = ßo + ßi*FY + ß2*(FY-C)*FR + ß3*FR
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(4)

where ßo is the Y-axis intercept, ßi is the slope of the regression line for the first period
regression line, ßi+ß2 is the slope of the second period regression line, and ß3 is the jump
in intercept between periods. Similar testing was performed for the period 1984-1998
(flight mishap only data) to see if there was any change from the previous RM test in the
effect of RM after 1987. The breakpoint, C, was 87. The two variables for test two were
FY and RM just as in the full model presented in the previous RM piecewise analysis. A
summary of the variables for both tests for the Class A and Class B-C mishap categories
is presented in Table 9.

Table 9. Variables for Piecewise Regression Tests
Test#
1
2

Period
1973-1983
1984-1987
1984-1987
1988-1998

FR RM
0 N/A
1 N/A
N/A 0
N/A 1

The same hypotheses as in the previous analysis apply here as well. The results and
analysis for the Class A category are first presented followed by those of the Class B-C
category.
Class A Mishap Category.
Results: Test One. Tables 10 and 11 summarize the overall and
partial F-test results respectively from test one (1973-1987) of the Class A mishap
category. With the given p-values, the overall F-test indicates that 1) the slope of the first
line, ßi, is significantly different from zero and 2) that there is no significant jump at
1983. The partial F-tests on the reduced model indicate that 1) the slope of the second
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üne,ßi+ß2, is not significantly different from zero, and 2) that the slopes of the regression
lines are not significantly different from one another. Figure 11 presents the results
graphically.

Table 10. Overall F-test Results: Class A, Test One, 1973-1987
Term
Intercept
FY
(FY-84)xFR
FR

Beta

ßo
Pi

ß2
ß3

Beta
Coefficients
12.524
-.122
-.083
.479

P-Value
.0008
.0051
.6274
.3519

Reject Null?
N/A
Yes
N/A
No

Table 11. Partial F-test Results: Class A, Test One, 1973-1987
Beta
ßi+ß2

ß2

Slope of Line
1984-1987
-.205
N/A

Fcrit

Fstat

4.844
4.844

1.573
.249

Reject Null?
No
No

Analysis: Test One. The partial F-tests showed that the slope of
the regression line for the 1973-1984 period was significant, that the slope the regression
line from 1984-1987 was not significant and yet the slope of the two lines were not
significantly different from one another. The insignificant slope of the second regression
line is most likely due to the high variability associated with having only four data points.
There is not much statistical power with only four data points. However, a look at Figure
11 confirms that the slopes of the two lines are not much different. To draw conclusions
from this test, more weight was put on the result that the slopes of the two lines were not
significantly different. Therefore, test one indicated that there was no significant change
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in the Class A mishap rate due to the inclusion of flight-related mishaps in the rate
calculation.
Results: Test Two. The overall and partial F-test results
respectively from test two (1984-1998) are presented in Tables 12 and 13. With the
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Figure 11. Class A Mishap Rate (Flight-Related Confound)
given p-values, the overall F-test indicates that 1) the slope of the first line, ßi, is not
significantly different from zero and 2) that there is no significant jump at 1987.

Table 12. Overall F-test Results: Class A, Test Two, 1984-1998
Term
Intercept
FY
(FY-87)xRM
RM

Beta
ßo
ßi

ß2
ß3

Beta
Coefficients
19.93
-.205
.115
-.063
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P-Value
.1401
.1890
.4590
.8618

Reject Null?
N/A
No
N/A
No

Table 13. Partial F-test Results: Class A, Test Two, 1984-1998
Beta
ßi+ß2

ß2

Slope of Line
1988-1998
-.09
N/A

Fcrit

Fstat

4.965
4.965

8.158
.593

Reject Null?
Yes
No

The partial F-tests on the reduced model indicate that 1) the slope of the second line,
ßi+ß2, is significantly different from zero, and 2) that the slopes of the regression lines
are not significantly different from one another. Figure 11 depicts the results of test two
graphically.
Analysis: Test Two. Test two had similar results to test one for
the 1984-1987 period. Again, the high variability of having only four data points of
flight-only mishaps before the implementation of RM probably negates any relevant
slope that likely exists. Conclusions drawn were based more on the results that there was
no jump at 1987 and that the slopes of the two lines were not significantly different from
one another. Therefore, test two validated that the flight-related mishap confound does
not appear to change the fact that RM has not affected a change in the Class A mishap
rate.
Class B-C Mishap Category.
Results: Test One. The results of test one (1973-1987) are
summarized in Tables 14 and 15. With the given p-values, the overall F-test indicates
that 1) the slope of the first line, pi, is significantly different from zero and 2) that there is
no significant jump at 1987 at the a = .05 level of significance. The partial F-tests on the
reduced model indicate that 1) the slope of the second line, ßi+ß2, is not significantly
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Table 14. Overall F-test Results: Class B-C, Test One, 1973-1987
Term
Intercept
FY
FR'xFR
FR

Beta
ßo
Pi

h
h

Beta
Coefficients
64.855
-.622
.435
-7.277

P-Value
.0107
.0423
.7442
.0839

Reject Null?
N/A
Yes
N/A
No

Table 15. Partial F-test Results: Class B-C, Test Two, 1973-1987
Beta
ßl+ß2

ß2

Slope of Line
1984-1987
-.187
N/A

Fait

Fstat

4.844
4.844

.022
.112

Reject Null?
No
No

different from zero, and 2) that the slopes of the regression lines are not significantly
different from one another. Figure 12 presents the results graphically.
Analysis: Test One. Test one showed the jump at 1983 to be
insignificant at a = .05 with a p-value of the ß3 term of .0839. However, by looking at
Figure 12, it is apparent that there ought to be a significant jump at 1983. Relaxing the
level of significance to a = .1 reveals that the jump is statistically significant. Practically
speaking, this makes sense. Flight-related mishaps, by definition, are not usually going
to result in high dollar value damage. Therefore they tend to fall into the Class B-C
mishap category. By removing the Class B-C flight-related mishaps from the mishap rate
calculation before 1983, one would expect a significant drop in the mishap rate. This
may partially explain why the rate appears to have increased since 1987. Based on the
results and practical judgement, it appears that the flight-related confound has had a
significant effect on the Class B-C mishap rate. Test two determined how this change
might have affected any influence that RM may have had.
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Results: Test Two. The results of test two (1984-1998) are
presented in Tables 16 and 17. With the given p-values, the overall F-test indicates that
1) the slope of the first line, ßi, is not significantly different from zero, and 2) that there is
no significant jump at 1987. The partial F-tests on the reduced model indicate that 1) the
Table 16. Overall F-test Results: Class B-C, Test Two, 1984-1998
Term
Intercept
FY
(FY-87)xRM
RM

Beta

ßo
ßi

ß2
ßs

Beta
Coefficients
21.511
-.187
.576
-.956

P-Value
.6235
.7145
.2822
.4340

Reject Null?
N/A
No
N/A
No

Table 17. Partial F-test Results: Class B-C, Test Two, 1984-1998
Beta
ßi+ß2

ß2

Slope of Line
1988-1998
.389
N/A

Font

Fstat

4.844
4.844

13.41
1.279

Reject Null?
Yes
No

slope of the second line, ßi+ß2, is significantly different from zero, and 2) that the slopes
of the regression lines are not significantly different from one another.
Analysis: Test Two. The fact that the slope of the regression line
of the 1984-1987 time period, ßl, is not significantly different from zero is not surprising
because that was the same result from test one where the slope of the same line was
represented by ßi+ß2. Based on the results, the apparent effect of the flight-related
confound did not affect any influence that RM may have had.
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Figure 12. Class B-C Aviation Mishap Rate (Flight-Related Confound)
Summary. Given a significant difference in the mishap rate after RM
implementation, Investigative Question 3a asked how much of an effect RM
implementation might have had on the mishap rate. A confound discovered during data
collection was that before 1983, the mishap rate calculation included flight-related
mishaps. Therefore, before directly focusing the investigative question, the effect of the
confound had to be addressed. To address the investigative question, then, required two
steps. First, analyses of the data in the period 1973-1987 were performed with abreak
point at 1983. This compared mishap rates including flight-related mishaps (1973-1983)
to mishap rates based on flight mishaps only but excluding the years after RM
implementation (1984-1987). Second, analyses of the data in the period 1984-1998 were
performed with at break point at 1987. This compared mishap rates based on flight
mishaps only before and after the implementation of RM. For the Class A mishap
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category, test one showed no significant change in the Class A mishap rate by excluding
flight-related mishaps from the rate calculation after 1983. Test two validated that
accounting for the flight-related mishap confound did not change the earlier conclusion
that RM has not affected a change in the Class A mishap rate. For the Class B-C
category, test one showed a significant change (at a = .1) in the mishap rate by excluding
flight-related mishaps from the rate calculation after 1983. However, this finding did not
affect any influence that RM may have had on the mishap rate.
To further to address Investigative Question 3b and the flight-related confound,
stepwise regression analysis was performed.
Stepwise Regression Analysis. Stepwise regression is normally used as a
screening procedure to pare down a large number of independent variables to the
important few for manageable model building (McClave 1998:643-648). Although only
three variables were considered in the previous analyses (FY, RM, and FR), stepwise
regression analysis was performed as an additional test to determine the relative
importance of these variables. The variables that are selected by the stepwise process are
the ones that significantly contribute to the model. The relatively less important variables
will not be selected.
Inputting one variable at a time into the model performs forward stepwise
regression. As each new variable is introduced, t-tests are performed to determine
whether the variable belongs in the model. Backward stepwise regression is performed
by inputting all variables into the model at one time and performing t-tests on each
variable to determine which ones to extract from the model.
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Methodology. Backward stepwise regression was conducted using JMP®
Version 3 for fiscal year periods 1973-1998 and 1984-1998 for Class A and Class B-C
mishap categories. To represent the effect of the mishap reporting method (flight and
flight-related mishaps vs. flight mishaps only), FR = 1 for years 1973-1983 and FR = 0
for years 1984-1998. Similarly, to represent the effect of the presence of risk
management, RM = 0 for years 1973-1987 and RM = 1 for years 1988-1998. The 19841998 data set was tested for both mishap rate categories to see if the effect of RM could
be more clearly seen without the effect of the flight-related variable. Both the full and
reduced mathematical models are presented in Appendix H. Coefficients of
determination (R2) values of the resulting models are also presented. The R2 value is the
percent of variability in the expected mishap rate that can be explained by using the
independent variables to predict the expected mishap rate in the straight line model
(McClave, 1998:467). The higher the R2 value the more variability that is explained.
The Class A mishap category results and analysis are first presented followed by those of
the Class B-C mishap category.
Class A Mishaps 1973-1998.
Results and Analysis. The beta coefficients and their
corresponding p-values for both the full and backward stepwise regression results are
presented in Tables 18 and 19 respectively. The backward stepwise regression analysis
results produced an R2 = .8618. It also showed that the FY term was the only term that
had any significant effect on the expected mishap rate. This model indicates that the
expected mishap rate is on a downward trend and depends mainly upon the fiscal year.
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Table 18. Stepwise Full Model: Class A,
Terms
Beta Beta Coefficients
Intercept
19.93
ßo
FY
-.205
ßi
RM
-10.0347
ß2
FR
-7.405818
ß3
FY*RM
.1146212
ßl2
FY*FR
.0834545
ßl3

1973-1998
P-Values
.1413
.1929
.4613
.5821
.4698
.5972

Table 19. Stepwise Results: Class A, 1973-1998
Terms
Intercept
FY

Beta
ßo
ßi

Beta Estimates
11.190
-.104

P-Values
.0001
.0001

The results are consistent with those found in previous regression analyses. It does
not appear that the inclusion of flight-related mishaps in the rate calculation was a
significant factor. Nor does it appear that the presence of RM was a factor in the
reduction of the Class A mishap rate.
Class A Mishaps 1984-1998.
Results and Analysis. The beta coefficients and their
corresponding p-values for both the full and backward stepwise regression results are
presented in Tables 20 and 21.

Table 20. Stepwise Full Model: Class A,
Terms
Beta Beta Coefficients
Intercept
19.930
ßo
FY
-.205
ßi
RM
-10.035
ß2
FY*RM
.115
ßl2
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1984-1998
P-Values
.1401
.1890
.4505
.4590

Table 21. Stepwise Results: Class A, 1984-1998
Terms
Intercept
FY

Beta
ßo
ßi

Beta Coefficients
11.826
-.111

P-Values
.0001
.0001

The backward stepwise regression analysis results produced an R = .7474. It also
showed that the FY term was the only term that had any significant effect on the expected
mishap rate. This model is virtually the same as for as the model for the 1973-1998
period. The effect of RM is no more clearly seen in this test than in the previous tests.
Class B-C Mishaps 1973-1998.
Results and Analysis. The beta coefficients and their
corresponding p-values for both the full and backward stepwise regression results are
presented in Tables 22 and 23. The backward stepwise regression analysis results
produced an R2 = .8801. It also showed that the FY*FR term was the only term that had
no significant effect on the expected mishap rate. The effect of the flight-related confound

Table 22. Full Model: Class B-C, 1973-1998
Terms
Intercept
FY
ßi

ß2

FY*RM
FY*FR

Beta
ßo
ßi

ß2
ß3
ßl2
ßl3

Beta Coefficients
21.511
-.187
-56.101
43.344
.627
.435

P-Values
.8041
.8537
.5309
.6245
.5472
.6756

the 1973-1983 period is the same as that for the 1984-1987 period (FR = RM = 0).
However, the intercepts are different. This is consistent with the earlier results that
showed a significant jump in the regression line at 1983. When FR = 0 and RM = 1, the
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Table 23. Stepwise Results: Class B-C, 1973-1998
Terms
Intercept
FY
RM
FR
FY*RM

Beta
ßo
ßi

ß2
ßs
ßl2

Beta Coefficients
57.049
-.602
-91.639
6.332
1.043

P-Values
.0039
.0079
.0025
.0048
.0021

positive slope of the model indicates that during the years RM has been in effect, the
Class B-C category mishap rate has increased. A discussion of the possibilities for this
increase was previously presented under the piecewise regression analysis for this period.
Class B-C Mishaps 1984-1998.
Results and Analysis. The beta coefficients and their
corresponding p-values for both the full model and backward stepwise regression results
are presented in Tables 24 and 25.
Table 24. Full Model: Class B-C, 1984-1998
Terms
Beta Beta Coefficients P-Values
Intercept
21.511
.5065
ßo
FY
-.187
.6196
ßi
RM
-56.101
.1109
ß2
FY*RM
.627
.1241
ßl2
Table 25. Stepwise Results: Class B-C, 1984-1998
Terms
Beta Beta Coefficients P-Values
Intercept
-29.702
.0017
ßo
FY
.412
.0005
ßi
RM
-2.245
.0204
ß2
The backward stepwise regression analysis results produced an R2 = .7131. It also
showed that the FY*RM term did not significantly contribute to predicting the expected
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mishap rate. This model is virtually the same as the model produced in the 1973-1998
test for this period. Again, the important note of interest is the positive slope indicating
an increasing Class B-C mishap trend since 1988.
Summary. Stepwise regression was employed to determine the relative
significance of the variables for predicting the mishap rate. The results from all tests
were consistent with those found in previous analyses. For the Class A mishap category,
the rate is dependent only upon the fiscal year. For the Class B-C category the mishap
rate depends not only upon the fiscal year but what policies were in effect. Prior to 1983,
the flight-related confound was a significant factor. After 1987, the presence of RM was
a significant variable in predicting the mishap rate. Since a purpose of RM is to prevent
mishaps, it is unlikely that RM would contribute to a rising mishap rate.
Since RM is designed to prevent human error mishaps, mishap causal data was
obtained for analysis of the human error-related mishaps.
Analysis of Human Error-Related Mishaps. It is estimated that 70 percent of
aviation mishaps have human error as at least a causal factor (Department of Defense,
1997:31). Considering that one of the purposes of RM is to prevent human error
mishaps, one might expect to see a reduction in the proportion of human error- related
mishaps if RM was effective. The Army causal data before the implementation of RM
was not available. Therefore, the data from 1990 to 1998 was analyzed to determine the
proportion of Class A, B, and C mishaps where human error was at least a cause factor.
Results and Analysis. The results shown in Table 26 are the average
proportions of causes by mishap class.
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Table 26. Average Proportion of Mishaps by Cause and Class
Class Human Error Material Failure Environmental Undet.
A
.770
.251
.059
.070
B
.745
.306
.102
.082
C
.642
.225
.094
.133
Note: Proportions by class do not add to 100 percent because there can
be more than one cause for a mishap
Although the number and rate of Class A mishaps has decreased in absolute terms over
the years, the average proportion of human error-related Class A mishaps is comparable
to the average of 70 percent cited above. The numbers and causes of Class B and C
mishaps before 1990 were not available, but the average proportion since 1990 is also
comparable to 70 percent. Of note is that as the average proportion of human error
mishaps decreases with class, the proportion of undetermined causes increases.
Figures 13 and 14 presents the human error-related mishap proportions from 1990
to 1998. As Figure 13 shows, the trend of the proportion of human error-related mishaps
is slightly increasing. Earlier analysis showed that the overall Class A mishap rate was
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98

decreasing for this period. As Figure 14 shows, Classes B and C have decreasing trends
of human error-related mishap proportions. Earlier analysis showed that the overall Class
B-C mishap rate was increasing during this period. Without data before 1990, it is not
possible to determine any relationship between a change in the proportion of human
error-related mishaps with the presence of RM. The graph indicates that the Class A
mishaps related to human error are on a slight downward trend. This is consistent with
previous analysis that found that the Class A mishap rate has been steadily declining
since 1973. This analysis indicates that, since 1990, as the rate of human-error related
mishaps declines, the overall Class A mishap rate declines. Class B mishap rate is
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Figure 14. Classes B and C Human Error-Related Mishap Proportions
constant and the Class C mishap rate is on an upward trend. This indicates that the Class
C human error-related mishap rate drives the upward
Figure 15 compares human error-related mishap rate trends for each category.
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-Class A -»-Class B -*-Class C |

Figure ID". Human Error Mishap Rate
trend in the overall Class B-C mishap rate. Table 27 summarizes the class-human error
trends for the 1990-1998 period. If RM was effective, one would expect not only

Table 27. Class - Human Error Trends
Class
B

Human Error Rate
Decreasing
Constant
Increasing

Human Error Proportion
Increasing
Decreasing
Decreasing

the human error rate to decrease but the human error proportion to decrease as well.
With the data available, it is only possible to see what occurred after RM took effect.
Summary. This section analyzed the causal data from 1990-1998 to determine
trends in the rates and proportions of human error-related mishaps. A summary of trends
was presented in Table 16. If RM is to have any effect on the mishap rate, then RM
should reduce the human error-related mishap rate. Additionally, the proportion of
human error-related mishaps should decline. No specific conclusions concerning the
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effect of RM on the human error-related causes could be drawn without causal data
before 1987.

Summary
This chapter is the focal point of the research project. It addressed the sources
and description of the data. It then pointed out various potential threats to the internal
and external validity of the research. The largest threat to the overall validity of the
research is history. Specifically, any reduction in the mishap rate must first be attributed
to the mishap prevention factors described in Chapter II: leadership, mishap
investigation, technological advances, and cockpit resource management. Any remaining
contribution can be attributed to the impact of RM. Last, it presented the methodology,
results, and analysis of the data. Four types of statistical tests were performed to analyze
the data: 1) comparison of means of percentage period indexes 2) comparison of the
residual variances of the mishap rate values, 3) discontinuous piecewise linear regression,
and 4) stepwise regression. Finally, an analysis of the proportions and rates of human
error-related mishaps by cause type was conducted.
The comparison of means test found that the mean PPIs for each time period for
the Class A mishap category were not significantly different. The same was true for the
Class B-C mishap category. The residual variance test found that for the Class A mishap
category, there was no significant difference in the mishap rate process. However, for the
Class B-C category the residual variance for the 1988-1998 time period was significantly
less than that of the 1973-1987 time period. This indicated the occurrence of a process
change. The piecewise linear regression analysis results indicated that the change in the
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mishap rate process could not be attributed to the presence of RM. Stepwise regression
analysis confirmed the piecewise analysis results. The human error-related mishap
proportions analysis found was an upward trend since 1990 in the Class A category.
However, for the Class B and C categories, the proportions have declined. The Class A
human error-related mishap rate has declined since 1990. This is consistent with the fact
that the overall Class A mishap rate has been on a downward trend since 1973. In the
Class B mishap category, the rate has been constant. In the Class C mishap category,
human error-related mishaps have driven the upward Class B-C mishap rates since 1990.
Based on the results, analysis, and answers to the three investigative questions
addressed in this chapter, overall research conclusions and recommendations can be
made. These are presented in Chapter IV.
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IV. Conclusions And Recommendations

Overview
The Air Force Class A aviation mishap rate has been steadily holding at about 1.5
mishaps per 100,000 flight hours since the mid-1980*s. Due to its increasingly limited
resources and recent increased concern over flight safety, the Air Force is seeking ways
of reducing aviation mishaps. The Army's Class A mishap rate, historically higher than
that of the Air Force (Appendix B), has declined to the point where it dipped below that
of the Air Force. Since the Army introduced RM in 1987, it has considered RM as a
contributing factor to the Class A mishap rate reduction. The Air Force completed initial
implementation of ORM in 1998 and is expecting to see its Class A mishap rate decrease.
This research sought to determine what expectations the Air Force can have regarding the
effect of ORM on its aviation mishap rate by examining the Army's implementation of
RM and its aviation mishap data. This chapter first reviews findings based on the
answers to the investigative questions. It then addresses the original research question
and presents conclusions based on the overall research. Finally, it makes
recommendations for future research.

Findings
Three findings are presented based on the research to answer the five investigative
questions posed in Chapter I.
Finding 1. The first research question sought to determine the major factors that
influence military aviation safety. Addressed in Chapter II, these factors were divided
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into two types: mishap cause factors and mishap prevention factors. The mishap cause
factors were based on the DoD mishap categories: human factor (error), material failure,
environmental, and other. A fifth factor, though not significantly substantiated, was
operations tempo. The mishap prevention factors were narrowed down to just four:
leadership, mishap investigation, advancement in technology, and human error
prevention programs.
Finding 2. The second investigative question sought to compare the Army's
implementation of RM with the Air Force's implementation of ORM. Also addressed in
Chapter II, the comparison was based on three criteria: published directives,
responsibility, and training. The literature review found two minor differences in how
the Army and Air Force have implemented risk management. First, there was a four year
delay in the Army's integration of RM training. The Air Force implemented ORM
training from the start. Second, the Army's initial focus of RM application was to the
acquisition, aviation, and field training areas. The Air Force ORM implementation began
in all operations and processes. Despite these differences, the Army and Air Force
implementations have not been significantly different from each other.
Finding 3. Chapter III addressed the last three investigative questions using
statistical analysis. The first of these asked whether there was any significant difference
in the mishap rate after the implementation of RM. In absolute terms, the rates are lower,
but the comparison of means of the period percentage indexes and the comparison of
residual variances tests, showed that for the Class A mishap rate, there was no significant
difference in the process over the years. Analysis of the Class B-C mishap rate, however,
showed that there was a significant difference in the process.
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Finding 3a. Since there was a difference in the Class B-C mishap category, the
analysis then focused on whether this change was due to RM. Although there was no
difference in the Class A mishap category, the analysis was performed to confirm the
previous results. The Class A mishap rate had been on a downward trend before 1987
and, as the discontinuous piecewise linear regression analysis confirmed, there was no
change in the trend after 1987. The Class B-C mishap rate had also been on a downward
trend before 1987 but actually began to rise since. The analysis thus found that this
change was not due to RM.
Finding 3b. The flight-related confound was not expected at the outset of this
research since it was discovered during data collection. Additional analysis had to be
performed to determine its effect on the mishap rate and, in turn, any effect the confound
had on masking any effect RM may have had on the mishap rate. The analysis found that
for the Class A mishap category, the confound had no effect on the rate. In turn, it did
not affect any impact RM may have had on the mishap rate. However, for the Class B-C
mishap category, the confound did have a significant effect on the mishap rate.
Nevertheless, this effect did not appear to mask any impact RM had on the mishap rate.
The confound may partially explain the apparent Class B-C mishap rate increase since
1987. Overall, it does not appear that RM has had much, if any effect on the Army
aviation mishap rate.

Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to determine, based on the Army's experience
with RM, whether the Air Force should expect a reduction in its aviation mishap rate
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after the implementation of ORM. Based on the findings from the research conducted,
the Air Force should not expect to see a significant decline in its mishap rate due to the
implementation of ORM.
There are two possible reasons the effect of RM does not appear in the mishap
rates. The first may be attributed to the findings from Chapter II. The Army began
implementation of RM in 1987 but there was a delay of four years before RM was
integrated into training and doctrine. Furthermore, responsibility for full integration was
not formally assigned until 1997. It may be several more years before the effect of RM is
reflected in its aviation mishap rates. The second reason is the effect of history. As
described earlier in this chapter, many events have occurred contemporaneous with RM
and since its inception that may also have affected the mishap rate. It is difficult to
differentiate the effect of RM from that of aircrew coordination training (ACT) since both
are aimed at reducing human error mishaps. However, the fact that ACT was not
officially implemented until 1994 strengthens the argument that the effect of RM has not
been reflected in the mishap rate. As a whole then, the mishap prevention factors
previously described were reducing the mishap rate before and since 1987. The
combination of these two reasons resulted in the undetectable effect of RM on the
aviation mishap rate.

Recommendations
Based on the preceding research, two recommendations are made.
Recommendation 1. The Army should continue with the integration and
application of RM throughout its operations. The groundwork has been laid in its
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doctrine, education and training system, acquisitions process, and, specifically, its
aviation processes. Much is yet to be done. Although the long-term mishap statistics do
not appear to show it yet, an effective RM program (all else being equal) should yield a
noticeable difference in the future. If the rate of human error-related mishaps declines,
the Class C mishap rate should reverse course and start a downward trend.
Recommendation 2. The second recommendation is for the Air Force to learn as
much about RM as it can from the Army (and other sister services). The Air Force
should not expect an immediate reduction in its Class A mishap rate due to ORM. In
addition, the Air Force may not see any improvements in its mishap rate at all.

Future Research
The Army and Air Force could both benefit from future research relating the
effect of risk management to the aviation mishap rate.
Benefit 1. The Army data required to perform a more in-depth analysis was not
available to the researcher. It would be worthwhile to look at the causal data before 1987
and compare it with the causal data after 1987. If the rates and proportions of human
error mishaps declined, it may be that RM had a more significant impact than what this
research showed.
Benefit 2. It may also be beneficial to repeat this analysis using a break point
other than 1987. Since much of the training and integration occurred several years after
initial implementation, a more appropriate break point may be defined. Results may
show that after full integration of RM, and a statistically significant number of years after
the new break point, the effect of RM would be reflected in the mishap rate.
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Benefit 3. Since one of the Air Force leaderships' motivations for implementing
ORM was to reduce the mishap rate, an analysis on the Air Force aviation mishap rate
similar to that performed in this study could be useful. Similarly, since the Navy and
Marines are also employing ORM, it would be useful to see what effect it has had on
their aviation mishap rates.

Summary
This chapter presented the research findings, conclusions, recommendations, and
future research possibilities. This research focused on the impact of RM on the Army
aviation mishap rate to determine what the Air Force should expect from ORM in terms
of a reduced aviation mishap rate. It concluded that the Air Force should not expect a
significant reduction in its aviation mishap rate due to the implementation of ORM.
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Appendix A: Army Data
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Appendix B: Air Force Data
Table B-l. Air Force Flight Mishap Data
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Table B-2. Average Proportion of Mishap Causes by Class, 1993-1998
Class
People
Parts
Paper
Other
A
0.637
0.122
0.139
0.101
B
0.407
0.271
0.131
0.192
C
0.276
0.389
0.058
0.277
Example: .637 = # people reasons -=- total # reasons
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Appendix C: Class A Relative Frequency Distribution
Including 1991
Residuals Class A Rate

Moments
Mean
Std Dev
Std Error Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N
Sum Weights

0.00000
0.49067
0.09623
0.19818
-0.19818
26.00000
26.00000

Test for Normality
Shapiro-WilkWTest
W Prob<W
0.803529 (3.0001
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Appendix D: Class A Relative Frequency Distribution
Excluding 1991
Residuals Class A 73-98 (-91)
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Appendix E: Class B-C Relative Frequency Distribution
Residuals Class B-C Rate

Moments
Mean
Std Dev
Std Error Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N
Sum Weights

0.00000
3.72033
0.74407
1.53566
-1.53566
25.00000
25.00000

Test for Normality
Shapiro-WilkWTest
W
Prob<W
0.943593
0.1882
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Appendix F: Comparison of Means Percentage Period Index Test Results
FY

Class A
Rate
PPI

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

4.09
3.24
3.52
3.24
3.00
3.10
2.70
2.34
2.63
3.29
2.33
2.53
2.94
1.97
2.17

88
89
90
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

73-87
mean =
variance =

(x-mean)

FY

10.00
7.92
10.86
9.20
9.26
10.33
8.71
8.67
11.24
12.51
7.08
10.86
11.62
6.70
11.02

0.072
3.278
1.281
0.279
0.224
0.361
1.046
1.136
2.271
7.713
7.024
1.268
3.565
9.191
1.646
40.354

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

18.02
16.85
16.65
19.41
18.81
16.76
16.07
19.25
19.11
11.14
8.05
5.65
5.61
5.90
4.93

10.00
9.35
9.88
11.66
9.69
8.91
9.59
11.98
9.93
5.83
7.23
7.02
9.93
10.50
8.36

0.46
0.00
0.31
5.46
0.14
0.17
0.07
7.06
0.36
12.21
4.38
5.30
0.37
1.39
0.93
38.61

1.84
1.90
1.83
1.57
1.77
1.64
0.83
0.74
1.26
1.34

8.48
10.33
9.63
8.58
11.27
9.27
5.06
8.92
17.03
10.63

2.074
0.165
0.083
1.796
1.835
0.428
23.604
1.008
50.518
0.512
82.023

88
89
90
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

2.76
5.28
4.67
6.29
7.93
7.43
7.06
7.49
7.35
8.24

5.59
19.17
8.85
13.45
12.61
9.38
9.50
10.60
9.81
11.22

29.44
66.42
4.71
5.92
2.54
2.69
2.30
0.17
1.45
0.04
115.70

9.73
2.882

88-98
mean =
variance =

73-87
mean =
variance =

9.32
2.758

88-98
mean =
variance =

SpA2 =

6.709

SpA2 =

5.321

9.92
9.114

—pooled variance—

Rate

Class B-C
PPI

(x-meany

Di f means
t-test
1.601
1.714
t-Crit
means are equal

Diff means
0.198
t-test
1.714
t-Crit
means are equal
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11.02
12.855

Appendix G: Comparison of Variance Test Results
Class A

Class B-C

FY
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Rate
4.09
3.24
3.52
3.24
3.00
3.10
2.70
2.34
2.63
3.29
2.33
2.53
2.94
1.97
2.17

Residua] s
0.5034 3
-0.24446
0.13765
-0.04024
-0.17813
0.02398
-0.2739 I
-0.53180
-0.13969
0.62242
-0.23547
0.06664I
0.5787fi
-0.289H^
0.09402

FY
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Rate
18.02
16.85
16.65
19.41
18.81
16.76
16.07
19.25
19.11
11.14
8.05
5.65
5.61
5.90
4.93

Residuals
-3.03914
-3.1365
-2.26995
1.56692
2.04014
1.05984
1.43942
5.6954
6.62421
-0.27373
-2.28714
-3.61268
-2.58058
-1.22621
0.82555

88
89
90
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

1.84
1.90
1.83
1.57
1.77
1.64
0.83
0.74
1.26
1.34

-0.14008
0.01582
0.04172
-0.02648
0.26942
0.23532
-0.47878
-0.47288
0.14301
0.31891

88
89
90
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

2.76
5.28
4.67
6.29
7.93
7.43
7.06
7.49
7.35
8.24

-1.73847
0.39581
-0.60473
0.22415
1.47394
0.58789
-0.17543
-0.14264
-0.67535
-0.17071

sA2_l=
nl =
dfl=nl

0.11554
15
14

sA2_l=
nl =
dfl=nl

10.529
15
14

sA2_2 =
n2 =
df2 = n2

0.08049
10
9

sA2_2 =
n2 =
df2 = n2

0.81098
10
9

F-stat
F-Crit

1.43544
3.803

F-stat
F-Crit

12.9831
3.803

i

variances are equal

variances are not equal
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Appendix H: Stepwise Regression Analysis Results
The full mathematical model for the 1973-1998 time period for both Class A and Class
B-C categories was:
E(MR) = ßo + ßi*FY + ß2*RM + ß3*FR + ß12*FY*RM + ß13*FY*FR
The full mathematical model for 1984-1998 time period for both Class A and Class B-C
categories was:
E(MR) = ßo + ßi*FY + ß2*RM + ß3*FY*RM
Class A
1973-1998:

E(MR)= 11.19- .104*FY

1984-1998

E(MR)= 11.826-.111*FY

Class B-C 1973-1998
E(MR) = 57.049 - .602*FY - 91.639*RM + 6.332*FR + 1.043*FY*RM
When FR = 1 and RM = 0 (1973-1983):
E(MR) = 63.381-.602*FY
When FR = 0 and RM = 0 (1984-1987):
E(MR) = 57.049 - .602*FY
When FR = 0 and RM = 1 (1988-1998):
E(MR) =-34.59 + .441 *FY
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1984-1998 Class B-C
E(MR) = -29.702 + .412*FY + -2.245*RM
When RM = 0(1984-1987):
E(MR) = -29.702 + .412*FY
WhenRM= 1(1988-1998):
E(MR) = -31.94 + .412*FY
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